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Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is a
Valid Exercise of Congress' Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity: Tennessee v. Lane
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - ELEVENTH AMENDMENT - STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - REMEDIAL
LEGISLATION - The Supreme Court of the United States held that
as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental
right of access to the courts, Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' au-
thority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.
Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004)
George Lane (hereinafter "Lane") was required on two separate
occasions to appear in a county courthouse in the State of Tennes-
see to answer criminal charges the State had filed against him.1
Lane is a paraplegic whose mobility is dependent upon the use of a
wheelchair.2 On each occasion when he was required to appear,
the proceedings were conducted on the second floor of the court-
house.' The courthouse building was not equipped with an eleva-
tor, leaving the stairway as the only available access to the second
floor.4 At his first appearance, Lane crawled up the stairs to get to
the courtroom, but refused to repeat this effort when he returned
to the courthouse for a second appearance.5 Lane also refused as-
sistance from courthouse officers when he returned to the court-
house for his second scheduled hearing.6 As a result, he was ar-
rested and incarcerated for failing to appear at this second pro-
ceeding.7
Beverly Jones (hereinafter "Jones") is also a paraplegic, depend-
ent upon the use of a wheelchair for mobility.8 Jones was a certi-
1. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1982 (2004).
2. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1982.
6. Id. at 1983.
7. Lane, 124 S. Ct at 1983.
8. Id. at 1982.
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fled court reporter, who performed services in that capacity for
parties to judicial proceedings.9 She alleged that, because of her
disability, she was unable to access several county courthouses
and that she was deprived of the opportunity to work, as well as to
participate in the judicial process.' °
Lane and Jones filed suit against the State of Tennessee (here-
inafter "the State"), as well as several counties alleging past and
ongoing violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (hereinafter "Title I"). 11 Lane and Jones each alleged
that they had been denied access to, or the services of, state court-
houses because of their disabilities.12
The State filed a motion to dismiss the suits filed by Lane and
Jones on the ground that it was immune from the suit pursuant to
the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.13 The
motion was denied by the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee." The State then appealed to the
Unites States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which en-
tered an order holding the case in abeyance.15 The court of appeals
then followed its own holding in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County
Court, affirming the district court's denial of the State's motion to
dismiss the case because the claims in the instant case were based
upon due process considerations. 6 The State filed a petition for
9. Brief for the Private Respondents at 5, Lane, (No. 02-1667).
10. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
11. Id. There were six named plaintiffs in the original complaint, all of whom alleged
violations of Title II of the Act for failure to provide access to courthouses for persons with
mobility disabilities. Brief for the Private Respondents at 4, Lane, (No. 02-1667). The
district court granted two separate motions to join the others as plaintiffs to this action.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
12. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982
13. Id. at 1983.
14. Id. The district court did not file an opinion after ruling upon this motion. Id.
15. Id. The circuit court awaited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), before ruling on the instant case. Id. at
1983. In Garrett, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars private suits seeking
money damages for state violations of Title I of the Act. Id. (citing Garrett, 531 U.S. at
360.) The Court, however, did not answer whether such suits were permitted under Title II
of the Act, providing, "[wie are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title
II .... is appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when the parties
have not favored us with briefing on the statutory question." Id. (citing Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 360).
16. Id. In Popovich, the majority of the court of appeals sitting en banc held that a
hearing impaired litigant seeking money damages could bring a suit against a State under
Title II of the Act over the States assertion of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citing
Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, 276 F.3d 808, 811-16 (6th Cir. 2002)). The majority in
Popovich interpreted the Garrett decision to bar private suits on equal protection grounds,
but not on the grounds of due process violations. Id. (citing Popovich, 276-F.3d at 811-16.)
rehearing, in which it argued that Popovich was not controlling
because the complaint submitted by Lane and Jones in the instant
case did not allege due process violations. 7 The court of appeals
filed an amended opinion in response to the petition for rehearing,
in which it did not reject the State's argument, but stated that the
questions presented could not be answered absent a fully devel-
oped factual record, and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
answer the question of whether Title II of the Act, enacted in part
to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment as they
apply to disabled persons, exceeded the power of Congress to ab-
rogate the state's sovereign immunity which is protected by the
Eleventh Amendment.19
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority of the Court, concluded
that Title II of the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
guarantees of that amendment as Title II applies to the class of
cases implicating the constitutional right of access to the courts."
He began his analysis by noting that Congress has broad author-
ity to enforce the Act "including the power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment and to regulate commerce."21 He then turned
to Title II of the Act, stating that Title II prohibits any public en-
tity from discriminating against qualified persons with disabilities
in the provision or operation of public services, programs, or ac-
tivities.22 Finally, the Court acknowledged that private citizens
17. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
18. Id. at 1984. In its amended opinion, the court of appeals stated that access to the
courts is a right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lane
v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d 680, 682 (6 Cir. 2003). Jones and Lane brought the suit to enforce
this right, each alleging that they were denied access to the courts because of the lack of
accommodations for disabled persons. Lane v. Tennessee, 315 F.3d at 683. Ultimately, the
court decided that there was not a sufficient factual record to decide the case, but disposed
of the case pursuant to its holding in Popovich that Title II of the Act was an appropriate
exercise of Congress' power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce individual's
due process rights. Id.
19. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1984
20. Id. The majority included Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id at
1981. Justice Souter concurred and filed a separate opinion in which Justice Ginsburg
joined. Id. Justice Ginsburg also concurred and filed separate opinion in which Justices
Souter and Breyer joined. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Id. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas each filed
separate dissenting opinions. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
21. Id. at 1984 (citing 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1990)).
22. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990)). "Public Entity" includes state and local gov-
ernments. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1990)). Persons with disabilities are "qualified" if
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are permitted to bring suits for money damages against states un-
der Title II, for violations of that title's provisions.23
Justice Stevens next turned his attention to the state's immu-
nity under the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits
brought against a state by citizens of another state, as well as
suits brought by a state's own citizens.24 He stated that Congress
may abrogate a state's immunity by unequivocally expressing its
intent to do so, as long as it acts pursuant to a valid grant of con-
stitutional authority.25 Applying this test to Title II of the Act,
Justice Stevens found the first requirement to be satisfied by the
language of the Act.26 Next, he addressed the question of whether
Congress had the power to give effect to this intent.27
The majority stated that Congress's power to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity is provided by section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.28 Under section 5, Congress is authorized to enact
prophylactic legislation to prevent and deter unconstitutional dis-
crimination. 29  This power is limited, however, as Congress may
not substantively change governing law.3" The Court set forth the
test to determine whether legislation is enacted pursuant to a
valid exercise of section 5 power in City of Boerne v. Flores.31 Such
legislation is valid if it "exhibits a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and means
they would otherwise be able to participate in or utilize services, programs, or activities
provided by a public entity. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1990)).
23. Id. The enforcement provision of Title II incorporates by reference the enforcement
provision of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which grants the authorization of private citi-
zens to file suits seeking monetary damages. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973)).
24. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1984. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This language has
been extended by the Supreme Court to include suits brought by a State's own citizens.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985.
25. Id. at 1985.
26. Id. The language of Title II of the Act provides: "A State shall not be immune un-
der the [Elleventh [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." Id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12202).
27. Id.
28. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1986.
31. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Boerne, the Court held that the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 exceeded Congress' authority because the RFRA was "so out of proportion"
to its objective that it worked a substantive change in constitutional protections. Lane, 124
S. Ct. at 1986-87 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512).
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adopted to that end."2 Justice Stevens then applied the Boerne
test to Title II of the Act to determine whether Congress exceeded
its section 5 power to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity."
Justice Stevens stated that the first step of the Boerne test re-
quires the Court to identify the constitutional right that Congress
sought to protect when it enacted Title H." In this case he identi-
fied the constitutional right in jeopardy to be the right of access to
the courts. 5 The analysis turned to decide whether Title II validly
protects this right.36 While recognizing Congress's power to enact
legislation pursuant to its section 5 authority, the Court stated
that "the appropriateness of the remedy depends on the gravity of
the harm it seeks to prevent."37 The majority recognized that the
harm sought to be prevented by Title II was the unequal treat-
ment in the administration of state services and programs, includ-
ing systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.3" The Court
found evidence of the pervasive nature of this harm in the docu-
mented history of unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons
arising in its own cases as well as cases in several other courts
that confirmed a consistent recurrence of unconstitutional treat-
ment in the judiciary.39 Focusing on the specific issue in the in-
stant case, the majority acknowledged the widespread inaccessi-
bility of state courthouses to disabled persons revealed by congres-
sional findings leading up to enactment of the ADA.4" Citing the
overwhelming evidence of the nature and extent of unconstitu-
tional discrimination against persons with disabilities in the pro-
vision of public services, the majority determined that the inade-
quate provision of public services and access to public facilities
was an appropriate subject for prophylactic legislation.41
Justice Stevens next considered the question of whether Title II
was a proportional legislative response to the discriminatory
32. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986.




37. Lane 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
38. Id. at 1989.
39. Id. at 1989-90.
40. Id. at 1989-90 The congressional findings were sourced by testimony before Con-
gress by disabled persons describing physical inaccessibility of local courthouses as well as
accounts given to the appointed task force of exclusion from state judicial services and
programs. Id. at 1990-91.
41. Id. at 1991.
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treatment of disabled persons seeking access to the courts.42 In his
proportionality analysis, Justice Stevens recognized that Con-
gress's chosen remedy was limited in that it required the states
only to take reasonable measures to accommodate disabled per-
sons.43 The majority noted that Title II requires reasonable modi-
fications only when an individual seeking modification is other-
wise eligible for the service.4 Furthermore, it recognized that a
state does not have to make such modifications if in doing so
would be financially or administratively burdensome, would
threaten historic preservation interests, or would cause the ser-
vice to suffer a fundamental alteration in nature. 5 The Court
then stated that a state's obligation to allow citizens to be heard in
its courts is consistent with the duty to accommodate.4 6 The ma-
jority concluded that the affirmative obligation to accommodate
disabled persons called for by Title II is proportional to the harm
sought to be remedied and is therefore a "reasonable prophylactic
measure, targeted to a legitimate end."7 Therefore, the Court up-
held Title II of the ADA as a valid exercise of Congress's section 5
48power.
Justice Souter filed a short concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the application of the congruence and proportionality
test to Title II of the Act.49 He noted that if the Court would have
engaged in a broader analysis, the evidence would have empha-
sized the appropriateness of action under section 5 because the
Court would have found that the judiciary itself had participated
in some of the practices that led to the discrimination that Con-
gress remedied." Justice Souter concluded by praising the Court's
effort in reversing this judicial trend.5'
Justice Ginsburg also filed a concurring opinion in which she
agreed with the reasoning of the majority and reiterated Con-
42. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993. Justice Stevens restricted the scope of his analysis to the
narrow issue of whether Title H was a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the
constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. He chose not to expand the analysis to
include all public facilities. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1990)).
45. Id. at 1994 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2003)).
46. Id.
47. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
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gress's objective in enacting the Act.52 She noted that disabled
persons are included in "We the People" and that Congress real-
ized that such persons required accommodation as opposed to in-
difference. 3 She argued that legislation governing all government
actors with respect to accommodating disabled persons was an
appropriate federalist approach as opposed to addressing each
state individually only when violations occurred.54 Justice Gins-
burg concluded by recognizing that the Court held appropriately
in supporting the uniform governance provided by Title II of the
Act, which Congress enacted based on the evidence of inaccessibil-
ity of the courts to disabled persons on a national scale.55
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which he
disagreed with the majority's holding that Title II was a valid ex-
ercise of Congress's section 5 power. 6 The Chief Justice argued
that the majority applied the congruence and proportionality test
inconsistently with the Court's recent precedents.57 He began his
analysis by stating that the constitutional right to be protected
under Title II is ambiguous because that Title "purports to enforce
a panoply of constitutional rights of disabled persons."58 Next, he
attacked the majority's finding that Congress enacted Title II in
response to violations of due process rights of disabled persons,
stating that the evidence relied upon by the majority focused on
an overall societal discrimination, and that it was irrelevant to the
enforcement of due process rights under Title H." The Chief Jus-
tice further contended on this point that the greater part of the
evidence relied upon by the majority focuses on discrimination not
by the states, but by non-state governments." He also argued that
52. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1996. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg stated Con-
gress' objective as "the elimination or reduction of physical and social structures that im-
pede people with some present, past, or perceived impairments from contributing, accord-
ing to their talents, to our Nation's social, economic, and civic life." Id. (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring).
53. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the approach set
forth by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion that Congress can impose §5 legislation
only upon states in which a violation has been established. Id. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
55. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 1997. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
57. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1998 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Alternatively, Chief Justice Rehnquist
argued that even if the evidence presented by the majority warranted its holding, a viola-
tion of due process could not be established merely on the grounds of architectural impedi-
Winter 2005 323
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Title II can only be read as an attempt to "rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment law laid down by this Court." 1
Turning to the proportionality branch of the Boerne test, the
Chief Justice stated that Title II goes beyond protection of due
process rights and applies to any service provided by any public
entity, therefore exceeding the scope of a constitutional review.62
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that because of this over-
breadth, Title II cannot validly abrogate the State's sovereign im-
munity.63 He disagreed with the majority's approach of narrowing
the focus of Title II to only the class of cases implicating access to
the courts, stating that in section 5 analysis, the proper approach
is to measure the entire statute against the constitutional right to
be enforced.' He argued that this approach would subject the
states to ongoing litigation to defend their Eleventh Amendment
immunity, as the legislature would defer to the courts to resolve
issues regarding enforcement of statutes against the states.65 The
Chief Justice further contended that, even when limited to pro-
tecting access to the courts, Title II does not abrogate immunity
because absent evidence of any denial of such access, Title II does
not meet the congruence and proportionality test.6  Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded his dissenting opinion by arguing that Title
II is not limited only to due process violations, but that a state
would face litigation for simply maintaining a courthouse that is
not equipped to accommodate disabled persons, regardless of any
due process violations.67
Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued
that requiring access for disabled persons to all public buildings
does not fit within the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 8 He began his analysis by noting the origins of Congress's
power to enact prophylactic legislation, providing that in its origi-
ments. Id. at 2002 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He stated that due process is violated
only when a person is actually denied the constitutional right to access to a judicial pro-
ceeding, and that the Court has never held that a person's ability to access a courtroom
without assistance is in itself a constitutional right. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2003 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist drew this conclusion after
comparing the Court's decisions in other cases where it ruled on section 5 legislation. Id. at
2003 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
63. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2004-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 2005 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2006 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
68. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2013. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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nal form, Congress's power to enact such remedial legislation was
limited to violations of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees on the
basis of racial discrimination.69 Next, he discussed the develop-
ment of the "congruence and proportionality" test, which arose in
Boerne to address legislation passed by Congress that exceeded
protection against racial discrimination. ° He then stated his op-
position to tests based upon flexible parameters - such as "con-
gruence and proportionality" - because they open the door to pol-
icy based adjudication.71 He also argued that the "congruence and
proportionality" test causes the courts to take on a role that calls
for recurring review of the actions of the legislature, thereby put-
ting the courts in conflict with that branch of government without
textual support of the Constitution.7" Justice Scalia went on to
suggest that the approach the majority took in requiring accessi-
bility to all public services is an overly broad prohibition that over-
laps a narrower prohibition.73 He stated that such an approach
does not fit within the meaning of "enforce" as that term is used in
section 5.74 He also stated that section 5 does not authorize pro-
phylactic legislation to prohibit conduct that, on its face, is consti-
tutional.75 Justice Scalia admitted that the approach he suggests,
if implemented, would contradict precedent set since the Court's
ruling in Morgan.76
Justice Scalia noted that the cases decided since Morgan have
expanded the scope of the meaning of "enforcement" in section 5.7
While Justice Scalia agrees that a broad interpretation is accept-
able with regard to racial discrimination cases, he stated that
cases outside of that realm call for a more narrow reading of sec-
tion 5.7.
Justice Scalia concluded his dissenting opinion by stating that
he would adhere to the limitation that Congress may enact pro-
phylactic legislation under section 5 only when constitutional vio-
69. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2007-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2009 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia suggested that he would insert a
test that has textual support in the Constitution in place of the "congruence and propor-
tionality" test. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2009 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2010 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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lations have been identified. 9 He also argued that such a remedy
should affect only the states and their actors, but not the public at
large." He stated that when racial discrimination is not at issue,
he would disregard the "congruence and proportionality" test, lim-
iting its application to true violations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."'
Justice Thomas filed a brief dissenting opinion in which he
joined the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion. He reiterated the
position that Title II does not meet the "congruence and propor-
tionality" test because the Act itself did not have evidentiary sup-
port of the harm it sought to remedy, and because the scope of Ti-
tle II extends beyond the protection of due process rights.83
Congress's legislative power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment was established in 1880 when the Supreme Court
decided the case Ex Parte Virginia.' In Ex Parte Virginia, Justice
Strong defined this section 5 power as the authority to enact ap-
propriate legislation adapted to enforce the objectives of the Four-
teenth Amendment." He declared that Congress's legislative
power is enlarged under section 5, which grants congressional au-
thority to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the constitutional
prohibitions that limit states' power.86
The intersection between this enforcement power and state sov-
ereign immunity was encountered by the Supreme Court in Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, where Justice Rehnquist explained in the major-
ity opinion that sovereign immunity is limited by the enforcement
provisions of section 5.87 In the Fitzpatrick majority, Justice
Rehnquist stated,
Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legislation'
for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, provide for private suits against states or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts. 8
79. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2012. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
85. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46.
86. Id. at 345.
87. 427 U.S. 445, 456, (1976).
88. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
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The Court has refined the exercise of this power by setting forth
the threshold requirements that first, if legislation purports to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, Congress must specifically
express its intent to do so in the language of that legislation, and
second, that such legislation must be passed under a valid exercise
of congressional power.89 Current Supreme Court jurisprudence
holds that the source of Congress's power in this regard is section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 °
The current test for whether section 5 legislation is passed un-
der a valid exercise of congressional power was set forth in City of
Boerne v. Flores.91 In Boerne, the Supreme Court announced the
"congruence and proportionality" test.9" The Boerne case arose
when the City Council of Boerne, Texas, denied a building permit
to enlarge St. Peter Catholic Church, because the church was
within the historical designation established under a recently
passed ordinance.93 Flores, the Archbishop of San Antonio, Texas,
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas, challenging the permit denial under the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (hereinafter "RFRA").94
The district court held that Congress exceeded its section 5 au-
thority in enacting RFRA, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that RFRA was constitutional.95
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals.96
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, stating that the issue
faced by the Court was whether RFRA exceeded Congress's power
under the enforcement provision of section 5 of the Fourteenth
89. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). See also, Dellmuth v.
Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
90. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. In Seminole Tribe, the Court recognized that at one
time, Congress had at its disposal two provisions of the Constitution from which it could
validly exercise this power: section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Id. at 59. Seminole Tribe upheld Congress's authority under section 5,
but overruled prior case law by declaring that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity through legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 72. (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
91. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
92. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
93. Id. at 512. The ordinance authorized the city's Historic Landmark Commission to
prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts, and required
the Commission to preapprove any construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in





328 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 43
Amendment. 7  Justice Kennedy stated at the outset that RFRA
was enacted by Congress in direct response to the Court's decision
in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith, in which the Court declined to apply a balancing test
to a Free Exercise claim." Kennedy noted that, among the Act's
stated purposes, are: "[T]o restore the compelling interest test...
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened."99 The proponents of RFRA
contended that RFRA was permissible enforcement legislation and
that Congress's section 5 power is not limited to remedial or pre-
ventative legislation.'0 The majority responded by explaining that
Congress's broad power of enforcement is a remedial power, and
that Congress is not empowered to redefine the substantive rights
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment's provisions.' Recogniz-
ing that it is difficult to distinguish between remedial action and
action that substantively changes governing law, the Court stated,
"[there must be a congruence and proportionality between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end." ' 2 The Court concluded that legislation enacted without "con-
97. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
98. Id. at 512-13. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, members of the Native American Church challenged an Oregon statute that gen-
erally prohibited the use of peyote, which the members used for sacramental purposes. Id.
at 513 (citing Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)). The test would have required the Court to ask whether a statute of
general applicability substantially burdened a religious practice, and, if so, whether it was
justified by a compelling government interest. Id. at 513. The Court said that applying
this test would have resulted in "a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general
applicability," which it deemed to be an anomaly of the law. Id. Smith held that a compel-
ling governmental interest is not required to justify neutral laws of general applicability
that burden religious practices. Id. at 514.
99. Id. at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1993)). Justice Kennedy next set forth the main
provisions of the Act, stating:
RFRA prohibits 'government' from 'substantially burdening' a person's exercise of re-
ligion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the gov-
ernment can demonstrate the burden '(1) is in furtherance of a compelling govern-
mental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.'
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1993). The Court noted that RFRA
broadly applied to any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official; any State
or subdivision of a state, and that it applied to all Federal and State law. Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1993)). The majority concluded that local and municipal
ordinances fell within this scope. Id.
100. Id. at 517.
101. Id. at 519.
102. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. Here, the Court gave birth to the "congruence and propor-
tionality" test. Id.
Tennessee v. Lane
gruence and proportionality" would be, in effect, substantive legis-
lation.
03
The Court justified its determination that section 5 authorizes
only remedial enforcement action by looking to the history of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 04  It noted that the
original draft of the amendment was widely criticized and rejected
on the ground that it gave Congress too much legislative power at
the expense of the existing constitutional structure. 5 The major-
ity stated that the rejection of this draft directly bears on the defi-
nition of Congress's enforcement power.' 6 After discussing the
litany of debates waged by Congress concerning the appropriate
language of the proposed amendment, the Court concluded that
the revised amendment provided Congress with a remedial power
of enforcement to give effect to the substantive constitutional pro-
hibitions against the states, not a plenary power to legislate. 7
Justice Kennedy next discussed the confirmation of this ap-
proach as demonstrated by The Civil Rights Cases, the earliest
cases faced with the decision of whether Congress exceeded its
enforcement power."' He noted that central to the holding in The
Civil Rights Cases was the notion that the enforcement clause did
not grant Congress the power to enact "general legislation upon
the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation."' 9 Justice Ken-
nedy continued by noting that the Court's recent cases regarding
the issue have centered upon the question of whether section 5
legislation can be considered to be remedial." He stated that this
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The original draft of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1st Sess., 1034 (1866).
106. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
107. Id. at 522.
108. Id. at 524-25. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated the first and second
sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prescribed criminal penalties for denying full
enjoyment of public accommodations and conveyances. Id. at 524 (citing United States v.
Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883)). The Court stated: "[U]nder the Fourteenth, as we have
already shown, it must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, ad-
dressed to counteract and afford relief against State regulations or proceedings." United
States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
109. Id. (citing Stanley, 109 U.S. at 13-14).
110. Id. at 525.
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case law supports the conclusion that Congress does not have a
substantive, non-remedial power."1
Finally, the majority turned to analyze RFRA to determine
whether it could be considered valid enforcement legislation under
section 5.112 First, the Court restated the test that "there must be
a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved" and also the "appropriateness of remedial measures
must be considered in light of the evil presented.""' Next, the ma-
jority detailed the legislative record behind RFRA finding that it
lacked evidence to support the harm RFRA sought to remedy.1
4
Before turning to RFRA's provisions, Justice Kennedy noted that
section 5 legislation should be confined to an injury or harm pro-
hibited by the Fourteenth Amendment."' With this in mind, he
attacked the breadth of RFRA and its restrictions, stating that
because RFRA calls for "intrusion at every level of government,"
applies to "all federal and state law," and has "no termination date
or termination mechanism," any person alleging a substantial
burden on free exercise of religion can challenge any law on any
one of those grounds." 6 He rejected the argument that RFRA was
remedial and preventative legislation because, by its terms, it is
"so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to pre-
vent, unconstitutional behavior."" 7 Instead, he decided that RFRA
was a congressional attempt to alter constitutional protections. 8
The Court noted that in comparison to RFRA, other legislation
Congress enacted under its enforcement power contained such
limitations as to scope and time."' The Court stated that although
such limitations are not determinative of valid section 5 enforce-
ment legislation, their existence makes it more likely than not
111. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
112. Id. at 529.
113. Id. at 530.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 532.
116. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 532-33. The Court referenced the Voting Rights Act in comparison to RFRA.
Id. at 532. Enforcement of The Voting Rights Act was confined to regions of the country
where voting discrimination was most flagrant. Id. at 532-33. Coverage was limited to
cases where constitutional violations were most probable, allowing the states to terminate
coverage under the act where violations had not taken place within five years leading up to
termination. Id. at 533.
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that Congress's "means are proportionate to ends legitimate under
section 5."'1
Finally, Justice Kennedy addressed RFRA's strict requirements
that when a law purports to substantially burden free exercise of
religion, a state must demonstrate a compelling interest, and must
show that it employed the least restrictive means possible."' Jus-
tice Kennedy stated that RFRA's requirements call for the strict-
est test under constitutional law which many laws would fail to
meet regardless of whether there was a direct impact on free exer-
cise of religion."' Because this would have the effect of validating
laws that would have been held invalid under Smith, Justice Ken-
nedy stated that RFRA is a substantive alteration of the Court's
holding in Smith. '
Ultimately, the majority determined that the purpose of RFRA
was not to identify and counteract state laws that unconstitution-
ally discriminate against religion, because the scope of RFRA ex-
tends to laws of general applicability that burden the entire popu-
lace.' The Court concluded that incidental burdens on religion do
not equate a greater burden on those people practicing religion
anymore than on other citizens.' For these reasons, the Court
struck down RFRA as an invalid exercise of Congress's section 5
enforcement power.'
The Court next had the opportunity to apply the "congruence
and proportionality" test in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board v. College Savings Bank.' In Florida Pre-
paid, College Savings Bank (hereinafter "College Savings") filed a
patent infringement suit against the State of Florida.' 8 Just prior
to the suit, Congress amended the Patent and Plant Variety Pro-
tection Remedy Clarification Act (hereinafter "Patent Remedy
Act") to expressly abrogate state sovereign immunity in suits
brought under that Act's provisions.'29 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that "Congress's intent to ab-
120. Id. at 533.
121. Boerne, 521 U.S. at. 533-34.
122. Id. at 534.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 535.
125. Id.
126. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
127. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
128. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630. College Savings alleged that the Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expenses Board, an entity created by the State of Florida, in-
fringed upon the patent it obtained for its college financing methodology. Id. at 630-31.
129. Id. at 630.
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rogate could not have been any clearer."3 ° He applied the "con-
gruence and proportionality" test, by first identifying the steps to
the test that were applied but not expressly stated in Boerne.3'
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the first step is for the Court
to identify the "evil or wrong that Congress intended to remedy."
1 32
Next, he stated, "the propriety of any section 5 legislation 'must be
judged with reference to the historical experience ... it reflects." 3
Rehnquist declared that the conduct at issue was patent infringe-
ment by the states coupled with employment of sovereign immu-
nity to deny patent owners any remedy.3 3 He stated that this
conduct must "give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation
that Congress sought to redress in the Patent Remedy Act."3  The
Court searched the legislative record behind the Patent Remedy
Act to determine if the Act reflected any historical experience of
unremedied patent infringement by the states.3 6 It determined
that Congress not only failed to identify a pattern of such conduct,
but it also did not reveal any pattern of constitutional violations.37
The Chief Justice then focused on a second argument raised to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, that unremedied patent in-
fringement by a state amounted to a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. 138 While recognizing that patents are con-
sidered a species of property, the deprivation of which Congress
may legislate to prevent, Chief Justice Rehnquist countered that
the legislative history of the Patent Remedy Act still failed to
show that Congress intended to remedy a Fourteenth Amendment
violation. 39 He stated that, under the terms of the Due Process
Clause, patent infringement by a state, in and of itself, is not a
constitutional violation unless that infringement is accompanied
by a failure of the state to provide a remedy."" Chief Justice
130. Id. at 635. The language Congress inserted into the amended provisions of the
Patent Remedy Act stated, "Any State ... shall not be immune, under the eleventh amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign
immunity, from suit in federal court ... for infringement of a patent." Id. (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 296 (1992)).
131. Id. at 639-40.
132. Id.






138. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S at 641-42.
139. Id. at 642.
140. Id. at 643.
Vol. 43
Tennessee v. Lane
Rehnquist continued by arguing that Congress did not consider in
great depth the state remedies available, but that it was presented
only with narrow evidence which amounted to complaints of the
inconvenience of state remedies, and assertions that resorting to
state remedies could undermine the uniformity of patent law.14'
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the importance of uniform-
ity in patent law but stated that it had no bearing on the issue of
whether a patentee suffered a deprivation of property without due
process as a result of a state pleading sovereign immunity in re-
sponse to claims of patent infringement.
14 2
The Court noted that under Boerne, lack of support in legisla-
tive history does not resolve the issue of whether Congress validly
exercised its section 5 power, but that the legislative history is a
key component to identifying the constitutional violation the Con-
gress sought to remedy.'43 Based on the minimal support of the
record behind the Patent Remedy Act that states engaged in un-
remedied patent infringement, the Court decided that the Patent
Remedy Act was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that fit] cannot be understood as responsive to,
or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."'44
Next, the majority discussed the unlimited potential for liability
under the Patent Remedy Act, noting that Congress subjected the
states to suits for patent infringement of every variety, for an in-
definite period of time.'45 The Court reiterated the principle set
forth in Boerne that limitations as to scope and time "tend to en-
sure Congress's means are proportionate to ends legitimate under
section 5. " 46 It stated that the Patent Remedy Act was not in line
with this principle because it contained no such limitations."'
Taking this along with the lack of legislative support, the majority
determined that the Patent Remedy Act was incongruent with the
conduct that Congress purported to remedy.4 8
The Court ultimately decided that the Patent Remedy Act was
really intended to provide uniformity of patent law, and to cause
the states to be subject to lawsuits for patent infringement "on the
141. Id. at 644.
142. Id. at 645.
143. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S at 646.
144. Id. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 532 (1997)).
145. Id at 646-47.
146. Id. at 647 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 533 (1997)).
147. Id.
148. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S at 647.
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same footing as private parties."149 Therefore, the Court ruled that
the Patent Remedy Act could not be upheld as valid exercise of
section 5 authority.5 '
The Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to ap-
ply the "congruence and proportionality" test to a discrimination
action arising under federal law in Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents.' The statue at issue in the Kimel case was the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter "ADEA"),
which prohibited discrimination against employees on the basis of
age. "'52 The case arose when three separate plaintiffs sued their
respective state employers for money damages, alleging violations
of ADEA resulting from discrimination on the basis of age.' In
each case, the state employers filed motions to dismiss the ADEA
claims on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.' Two of the
motions were denied by the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Florida, as the court held that ADEA validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity.'55 However, one motion was granted by
the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, which
held that ADEA did not validly abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity. ' Appeals were brought from each case and consolidated by
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' The court of ap-
peals, in a divided panel opinion, ruled that ADEA did not prop-
149. Id. at 647-48.
150. Id. at 648.
151. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
152. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66. ADEA "makes it unlawful for an employer, including a
State, 'fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual . . .because of such individual's age'." Id. at 67 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623
(1967)).
153. Id. at 69-71. In the first case, Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz, ages fifty
seven and fifty eight respectively, filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama, against the University of Montavallo, an instrumentality of the State of Ala-
bama. Id. at 69. The allegations were that the University's business college, at which both
plaintiffs worked, employed an employment evaluation system that had a disparate impact
on older faculty members. Id. The second case arose when current and former librarians of
Florida State University sued the Florida Board of Regents in the District Court for the
Northern District of Florida, alleging that that body refused to allocate funds to provide for
agreed upon salary adjustments which in turn negatively impacted older employees. Id. at
70. The final case was brought by Wellington Dickson against the Florida Department of
Corrections in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Kimel, 528 U.S. at
70. Dickson claimed that he was not promoted due to his age. Id.
154. Id. at 69-71.
155. Id. at 70-71.
156. Id. at 69.
157. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71.
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erly abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among several circuit
courts on the question of whether ADEA validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the issue
facing the Court was whether ADEA contains a clear statement of
Congress's intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity and, if so, whether ADEA is a proper exercise of Con-
gress's constitutional authority.6 Justice O'Connor first ad-
dressed the question of whether Congress clearly stated its intent
to abrogate state sovereign immunity.' Justice O'Connor inter-
preted sections 626(b) and 626(c)(1) of ADEA together, and deter-
mined that taken as a whole, ADEA clearly evidences Congress's
intent to subject the states to suits brought by private individuals
seeking money damages. 62
Having found that Congress expressly stated its intent to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity, the Court turned to the issue of
whether ADEA was appropriate legislation under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment under the "congruence and proportional-
ity test." The majority stated at the outset that the require-
ments sought to be imposed on the states by ADEA were dispro-
158. Id. (citing Kimel v. Fla. Board of Regents, 139 F,3d 1426, 1430, 1447 (11th Cir.
1998)). Out of a three judge panel, one judge held that Congress did not expressly state its
intent to abrogate, and another held that Congress did not act pursuant to a valid exercise
of section 5 power. Id. at 71-72. The third judge of the panel dissented on both grounds.
Id. at 72.
159. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 72. Several circuit courts of appeals invalidated ADEA. See
Cooper v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2nd Cir. 1998), Migneault
v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998), Coger v. Board of Regents of the State of Tenn., 154
F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998), Keeton v. University of Nev. System, 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.
1998), Scott v. University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998), and Goshtasby v. Board of
Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Circuit upheld
ADEA. See Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998).
160. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-67.
161. Id. at 73.
162. Id. at 73-74. Section 626(b) of ADEA incorporates by reference section 216 (b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which provides: "An action . . . may be maintained
against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1938)).
Section 203(x) of FSLA defines "public agency" to include "the government of a State or
political subdivision thereof, and any agency of ... a State or a political subdivision of a
State." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 74. (citing 29 U.S.C. §203(x) (1938)) (internal quotations omit-
ted). Section 626 (c)(1) provides: "Any person aggrieved by an employer's violation of the
Act 'may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction' for legal or equitable
relief." 29 U.S.C. §626(c)(1) (1967).
163. Kirnel, 528 U.S. at 81-83.
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portionate to any unconstitutional conduct sought to be cured."
Justice O'Connor recognized the argument that the conduct
sought to be cured gave rise to an Equal Protection claim. 65 She
reiterated that the Court has repeatedly held that claims of un-
constitutional age discrimination did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.'66 She conveyed the general principle of Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence that as long as states can show a rational rela-
tionship between an age classification and a legitimate state in-
terest, they can discriminate on the basis of age without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment.'67 With this in mind, Justice
O'Connor proceeded to strike down ADEA because its provisions
allowed a broad-based use of age as a discriminating characteris-
tic.'68 She argued that ADEA's provisions would prohibit a greater
number of state employment decisions than would be held uncon-
stitutional if the rational basis test for violation of the Equal Pro-
tection clause were to be applied.'69 The majority concluded that
ADEA was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preven-
tive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or de-
signed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."7 ' In addition to
this finding, the Court determined that Congress failed to identify
a pattern of age discrimination by the states prior to amending
ADEA to apply to the states. 7' It stated that the legislative record
offered no basis upon which Congress could have found that states
were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees. "2
Ultimately, the Court held that the "indiscriminate scope" of
ADEA and the lack of support in the legislative record rendered
ADEA an invalid exercise of Congress's section 5 legislative power
and, therefore, did not effectively abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity.
73
Prior to Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court first applied the
"congruence and proportionality" test to The Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (hereinafter "ADA") in Board of Trustees of




16 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
171. Id. at 89.
172. Id. at 90-91.
173. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
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the University of Alabama v. Patricia Garrett.'74 At issue in
Garrett was whether Title I of the ADA abrogated state sovereign
immunity in order to allow disabled employees to recover in suits
for money damages against state employers for failing to comply
with the ADA's requirements.
The Garrett case arose when two separate lawsuits were filed in
the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against
different state employers situated in the state of Alabama.' Each
suit alleged discrimination based upon disabilities suffered by the
plaintiffs.'77 In each case the defendants filed motions for sum-
mary judgment, claiming that the ADA exceeded Congress's power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 78 The district court granted
the motions, and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
consolidated the appeals and reversed, holding that the ADA did
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity.' The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts on the
question of whether an individual can maintain a suit for money
damages against a state under the ADA. 8°
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority and began his
analysis by discussing the substantive provisions of Title I of the
ADA.' 8 Title I forbids any employer, including states, from dis-
criminating against any disabled person in a variety of ways, be-
cause of their disability.'82 Where an employee or potential em-
ployee suffers from a disability, ADA requires employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" to those disabilities unless the ac-
174. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
175. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360.
176. Id. at 362.
177. Id. One suit was filed by Patricia Garrett, a registered nurse, against her employer
the University of Alabama in Birmingham Hospital. Id. Garrett was diagnosed with
breast cancer and her treatments required substantial absences from work. Id. Her em-
ployer notified her that she had to forfeit her director's position, and she subsequently
applied for and received a lower paying position. Id. The other suit was filed by Milton
Ash against the Alabama Department of Youth Services. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362. Ash
suffered from chronic asthma as well as sleep apnea and requested that his employer take
measures to accommodate his disabilities which the employer refused to do. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 362-63.
180. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
181. Id. at 360-61.
182. Id. The provisions of Title I forbid the discrimination "against any qualified indi-
vidual with a disability ... in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §12112(a), 12111(2), (5), (7)
(1990)).
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commodations would substantially affect the employer's business
operations."8 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist applied the "congruence and propor-
tionality" test beginning with the first step of identifying the con-
stitutional right at issue. 84 In doing so, he stated that the Court
had to determine whether state treatment of disabled persons fell
within the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Recogniz-
ing this conduct as giving rise to another potential Equal Protec-
tion claim, the Chief Justice followed the Court's approach in Ki-
mel, where it looked to prior case law dealing with the issue under
the Equal Protection Clause. i8 6 The Court reiterated that under
the "rational basis" standard applicable to Equal Protection
claims, states do not violate the Constitution as long as there is "a
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose." 7 Based upon this reasoning,
the Court declared that states are not compelled to make special
accommodations for disabled persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment as long as state action affecting such persons is ra-
- tional.
8 8
Moving through the "congruence and proportionality" test, the
majority examined the legislative record behind the ADA to de-
termine whether or not Congress uncovered a pattern of unconsti-
tutional treatment by the states.8 9 It found that Congress had
made findings of general mistreatment of disabled persons but the
majority of that mistreatment did not come from the hands of
states or state actors.'90 Furthermore, the minimal number of spe-
cific instances of unfair treatment actually committed by state
actors was not persuasive in the Court's eyes.'9' Accordingly, the
majority decided that the legislative history did not support the
183. Id. at 361 The ADA requires employers to "make reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a dis-
ability who is an applicant or employee, unless the [employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's] busi-
ness." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A) (1990)).
184. Id. at 364.
185. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 366-67.
188. Id. at 367-68.
189. Id. at 368.
190. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
191. Id. at 370.
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notion that Congress had identified a recurring pattern of uncon-
stitutional discrimination.
19 2
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist guided the analysis to the
scope of the "rights and remedies" which the ADA provided
against the states.9 First, he noted that the ADA requires that
employers make existing facilities usable by disabled persons, de-
manded that the states take affirmative action to accommodate
those with disabilities and virtually prohibited states from simply
hiring people who could readily use existing facilities.94 The Chief
Justice acknowledged that, under Title I, a state would not be re-
quired to make "reasonable accommodations" if it realized an un-
due burden in making such accommodations. 5 But he argued
that, despite this exception, states were still subject to a duty to
accommodate disabled persons under Title I, which exceeded any
accommodation required by the Constitution.'96 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning was that the undue burden requirement
prohibits almost any alternative action available to a state, even if
that action would be rational.'97 Furthermore, Chief Justice
Rehnquist disagreed with the fact that, under the ADA, the bur-
den of proving an undue burden fell to the employer rather than
requiring the claimant to prove that the employer did not have a
rational basis for its actions.9 Finally, he discussed the ADA's
prohibition on using "standards, criteria, or methods of admini-
stration" that would have a disparate impact on disabled per-
sons.99  Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that disparate impact
would not hold up as evidence of discrimination even under a
strict scrutiny analysis, let alone a rational basis test.
2
11
The Court concluded by recognizing Congress's authority to en-
act legislation pursuant to desirable public policy, which the ADA
reflected.2 ' However, it reiterated that in order to subject states
to private lawsuits for money damages, Congress is required to
identify a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the remedy chosen by Con-
192. Id. at 368.
193. Id. at 372.
194. Id.





200. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
201. Id. at 374.
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gress must be congruent and proportional to that violation. 22 Be-
cause the ADA did not meet these requirements, the majority
stated that applying the ADA's provisions to the states would
permit the legislature to work a substantive change in governing
law.20 ' Therefore, the Court held that the ADA did not validly ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity.0 4
The authority of the federal government to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity remains a hot button issue and there is little
doubt that it will appear before the United States Supreme Court
again in the near future. The issue goes right to the heart of the
federalist system created by the Constitution, invoking the strong
competing principles of the federal government's power and the
limits of the exercise of that power over the states. There is a line
drawn between the federal government and the states, which has
been erased and redrawn throughout this country's short history.
The federal government and the sovereign states continue to peer
across that line at each other waiting for the other to blink.
From the state side of the line comes the argument that states
should be immune from suits brought by citizens seeking mone-
tary damages. The federal government, however, is vested with
the authority to protect rights granted to citizens by the Four-
teenth Amendment against infringement by the states. The teeth
of any limitation on the ability to take away citizens' rights are
the consequences of violating such a limitation. The argument can
be made that any such limitation would be completely ineffective
if the citizen whose rights are violated could not seek legal reme-
dies. Without the threat of legal action, states could readily disre-
gard the law without fear of consequence. Thus, there is a funda-
mental necessity for allowing citizens to initiate legal proceedings
against a state. But then, the question becomes to what extent
can a citizen seek relief against the actions of a state? In some
cases, injunctive relief may suffice. However, it is implausible to
completely limit the remedies available to citizens to non-
monetary injunctive relief. How can justice be served when, be-
cause of state action, a citizen is deprived of income or, worse yet,
the ability to defend one's own liberty? Taking away the right to







On the other hand, should Congress be able to take away state
sovereign immunity at all? The states must be protected from an
onslaught of litigation by citizens seeking compensation for state
action, when that action may be in the best interests of the state
or other citizens of a state. The argument for prohibiting suits for
money damages was aptly presented by Justice Kennedy in Alden
v. Maine."5 First, the notion of state immunity is firmly rooted in
the Constitution.2 °6 It is the very structure of the Constitution
that demands that the states not be subjected to litigation at the
hands of its citizens.2 °7 Second, the financial demands placed upon
the states by having to pay out damages to litigants and attorney's
fees to litigate cases brought by citizens would create a burden
that the states may not be able to bear.28 Finally, enabling the
federal government to subject the states to lawsuits by its citizens
creates power in the federal government that is not provided for
by the Constitution.2 9
Both of these arguments carry significant weight and have been
vigorously disputed throughout history. A complete exploration of
this topic exceeds the scope of this text. Therefore, following the
Court in Tennessee v. Lane, the discussion will be limited to the
due process right of access to the courts of disabled persons as it is
protected by Title II of the ADA, the remedies such a litigant can
seek when that right is violated under Title II, and the states' in-
terest in being protected from suits seeking monetary damages.
When the right deprived is the right of access to the courts,
monetary damages must be available to the injured party. The
rationale behind this conclusion is found in the very reasons for
which a person would wish to appear in court in the first place.
Litigants appear in courts to advocate their rights, resolve dis-
putes, or to defend themselves against criminal charges. What
they seek is to recover something lost, or to defend against having
something taken away from them. A citizen who is denied access
to the courts will lose out on liberty, money, or some other funda-
mental right. The situation takes an even more egregious turn
205. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
206. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-16. Justice Kennedy stated: "Although the American people
had rejected other aspects of English political theory, the doctrine that a sovereign could
not be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified." Id.
207. Id. at 751.
208. Id. at 750.
209. Id. at 749.
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when a citizen has the desire and the means to invoke the justice
available through the courts, but cannot do so because of state
imposed barriers or a state fails to remove pre-existing barriers.
This is where Title II of the ADA comes to the rescue of the dis-
abled citizen. Title II demands that disabled persons be given ac-
cess to the courts, just as would any other citizen. Justice Gins-
burg echoed this point in her concurring opinion in Tennessee v.
Lane when she argued that disabled persons are included in "We
the People."21° Title II also enables disabled persons who are de-
nied access to the courts to seek monetary damages against a
state when the state is responsible for failing to provide access to
its courts. This is a legitimate means of enforcing a fundamental
right. As stated above, to provide for protection of a right without
a way to ensure compliance would render such protection ineffec-
tive.
The fear that states would be subjected to unlimited litigation
lacks merit. The states enjoy great protection even with Con-
gress's ability to abrogate sovereign immunity. This is because
Congress's authority in this area is extremely limited by judicial
review. Congress cannot simply remove state sovereign immunity
on a whim. An Act of Congress purporting to do so must pass con-
stitutional muster which, as history has shown, is a very tall task.
Title II of the ADA was up to the task, and met the Court's re-
quirements so as to be considered a valid enforcement mechanism.
Whether the "congruence and proportionality" test is an effective
way to evaluate an Act of Congress will be a topic that finds itself
debated time and again by the Court, by legal scholars, and by
practitioners of Constitutional law.
Justice Scalia makes a valid point in his dissent in Tennessee v.
Lane, that there is no textual support in the Constitution for the
congruence and proportionality test.21' However, it is a well rec-
ognized principle that the Constitution cannot and does not supply
in its text the answers to each and every case that necessitates
constitutional interpretation. The "congruence and proportional-
ity" test offers a logical and methodical way to evaluate legislation
enacted under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its pa-
rameters are sound, and not as flexible as Justice Scalia would
argue.
210. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1996 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 2009 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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For legislation to even fit within the test, the constitutional
right at issue must be found under the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is a narrow class of constitutional rights, and the Court has
struck down legislation that seeks to expand these rights.212 Next,
only if a Fourteenth Amendment right is at issue will the Court
move on to assess the "congruence and proportionality" of the leg-
islation. The "congruence" arm of the test is the simplest step. Its
function is simply to determine whether the legislation at issue
directly remedies the purported harm suffered. This is, of course,
a sound and necessary approach. Little explanation of this step is
given by the Court, nor is it needed. Finally, the proportionality
assessment is made to determine whether the burdens imposed by
remedial legislation are too great. The Court has identified limi-
tations that, if contained within legislation, operate to ensure that
a remedial scheme does not extend past the boundaries of being
proportional.21 Furthermore, each step of the test is required for
legislation to be upheld. The Court has been consistent with its
approach while running several different types of legislation
through the "congruence and proportionality" wringer.
The "congruence and proportionality" test is not without its
flaws, however. Applying the test is a tedious task, requiring an
extensive reading of the legislative history of the conduct in ques-
tion. The Court constantly downplays the role of legislative his-
tory and its determinative value, but the cases applying the con-
gruence and proportionality test show a heavy reliance on it.
Each step of the test hinges on the Court's interpretation of the
legislative record. This is problematic because there is no stan-
dard for determining the sufficiency of legislative history. Evalu-
ating the legislative record results in disputes among the Justices,
resulting in lengthy dissenting opinions, examining each and
every piece of evidence gleaned by the majority from the legisla-
tive record.
Overall, the "congruence and proportionality" test is a sound
and effective method for evaluating whether Congress has effec-
tively addressed a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Whether the
212. See Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
213. The Court stresses that such limitations are not determinative, but the cases show
that where they exist, they are instrumental to upholding or invalidating legislation. See
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Remedy Act contained
unlimited potential for states' liability for patent infringement).
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test stands up to the test of time and to changes in the composi-
tion of the Supreme Court is yet to be seen.
Aaron Ponzo
